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NOT SO HUMAN, 
AFTER ALL? 
BRENDAN SHEA, PHD 
In the future described in the Red Rising trilogy, many Golds believe they 
deserve to rule over the other Colors. They believe this, at least in part, 
because of the biological differences introduced by the use of genetic 
engineering. As described in the books, Gold women and men are on 
average faster, stronger, longer-lived, and (on their view) more 
“intelligent” than the other Colors. It with this in mind that Adrius “The 
Jackal” suggests that the Reds really do form a different species (homo 
flameus) from either the homo sapiens from which they descended or the 
Golds that dominate them. Later, he claims that Darrow is “not even 
evolved enough to have a Color…Just a homo sapiens playing in the realm 
of the gods” (MS, p. 439). Again, the suggestion is that individual Colors 
represent different species, with the Golds representing the “highest” 
species. 
The books suggest that the Jackal’s view about the relationship between 
the Colors might be, at least to some extent, an idiosyncratic one, reflective 
of his own warped view of reality. Darrow, for one, argues that the Jackal 
is “just a man.” Moreover, even powerful highColors such as Octavia au 
Lune and Quicksilver talk about the human “species” in ways that suggest 
they see it as a single community (even if Octavia thinks that Golds are 
uniquely qualified to lead the community). However, none of these people 
actually offer an argument against the Jackal’s claims concerning the 
biological relationships between the various Colors. It is easy enough, of 
course, to show that the Golds are not literally gods. However, this doesn’t 
get to the heart of the Jackal’s claim that the Golds really are different from 
the other Colors, and that these differences provide a justification for the 
Golds’ treatment of them. In this respect, it seems that the Jackal’s claim 
is merely an exaggerated version of what many Golds already accept. 
Moreover, it has clear parallels with the way that high status groups in our 
own world have often tried to “justify” their treatment of other groups. 
With this background in mind, I’ll be taking a more serious look at the 
Jackal’s claim, which will require thinking carefully about what exactly 
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species are. As it turns out, this is by no means a simple problem.  In the 
end, I’ll suggest that our concepts of biological species are not well-suited 
to deal with the sorts of claims that the Jackal makes, and that we ought to 
be very careful when using claims about biology to support political and 
ethical conclusions.  
 
ARISTOTLE’S ESSENTIALISM 
In our day-to-day to lives, we frequently distinguish between species of 
animals by looking for some “unique” characteristic that distinguishes 
them from otherwise similar species. Squirrels, for example, have bushy 
tales while chipmunks do not; American robins have red breasts while 
blackbirds are black; humans have the ability to speak languages that 
chimpanzees cannot. In the future described in the Red Rising series, it 
seems as though an average adult could probably do the same with regards 
the various Colors, given their distinctive appearances and physical 
characteristics. The size and color of an Obsidian, for example, makes it 
unlikely that she will be confused for a Red or Pink. 
Aristotle, the so-called “father of biology,” based his account of species 
on just this sort of idea. In particular, he proposed that an organism’s 
biological species was fixed by its having—or failing to have—the 
properties essential to that species, and which served to differentiate that 
species from other species in the same genus. Aristotle defined humans, 
for example, as the “rational animal,” since he thought it was our human 
capacity to reason (which included the use of language) that served to 
distinguish us from the larger group of animals.  
Aristotle’s account holds that the borders between species are both clear 
cut and immutable, which fit well with the later idea that each had been 
created by the separate act of an all-powerful God for a specific purpose. 
It also suggested a theory of what it meant to be a good or successful 
human (one ought to be as rational as possible), and to the relationship 
between humans and other species (animals, for example, were meant to 
be used by humans). It also seems to fit well with the Jackal’s claim that 
the Colors represent different species. The Colors, after all, were 
specifically designed by genetic engineering to fulfill distinctive tasks: 
Reds to mine, Pinks for pleasure, Silver to deal with money, Golds to rule, 
and so on. The Jackal would be especially pleased to learn that Aristotle 
himself proposed that some humans were “natural slaves,” who could 
fulfill their human potential only by allowing themselves to be governed 
by the reason of someone else. 
Happily, Aristotle’s claims about natural slaves, and about the essential 
nature of species, find little support in post-Darwinian biology. As it turns 
out, because of genetic variation, it is frequently impossible to find any 
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property (or group of properties) that perfectly distinguishes one species 
from another. Not every human is more intelligent than every chimp, for 
example, just as not every Red is shorter than every Gold. Moreover, the 
last 150 years of biological research has shown us that species themselves 
change and evolve over time, with some species going extinct, and others 
(slowly) emerging. For example, the mere fact that Golds were originally 
“designed” to rule and Reds “designed” to mine doesn’t provide any 
reason for thinking that these roles can’t change, or that society might not 
be better off if Reds were given an equal voice in government. Biology, it 
turns out, is not destiny.  
SPECIES AS INDIVIDUALS 
In contrast to Aristotle’s view that species were abstract types or 
categories of organisms, many contemporary biologists and philosophers 
of biology tend to think of species as individuals, in somewhat the same 
way that organisms are individuals. So, just as many individual cells make 
up an individual human body, many individual humans make up the 
species homo sapiens. This view, unlike Aristotle’s, does not presuppose 
that there is any characteristic that serves to differentiate the members of 
the species from all others. Species are simply groups of related organisms 
(or “lineages”) that live (or lived) in particular times and places. 
Of course, claiming that species are lineages doesn’t actually answer the 
question: “Where does one species end and another begin?” It doesn’t, for 
example, tell us whether Reds and Golds are separate species, or whether 
either (or both) of these are the same species as current-day homo sapiens. 
As it turns out, contemporary biologists and philosophers have proposed 
many different answers to this question. Here, we’ll take a look at three 
popular species concepts: one based on interbreeding, one based on shared 
ancestry, and a final one based on adaptations to the surrounding 
environment. In the real world, of course, new species usually emerge 
slowly, perhaps over millions of years. In the Red Rising universe, by 
contrast, the widespread use of genetic engineering has made things 
considerably different, as evidenced by the “Carved” creatures they can 
create. 
The most widely known species concept is probably Ernst Mayr’s 
biological species concept (BSC), which holds that species are groups of 
organisms that are capable of interbreeding with each other, but which are 
reproductively isolated from other such groups. On this view, for example, 
horses and pigs are separate species, since they are incapable of breeding 
at all. However, it turns out that horses and donkeys are also separate 
species, since their hybrid offspring (such as mules) are themselves sterile. 
When applied to the Red Rising universe, this view suggests that Golds 
and Reds really might form separate species, just as Adrius claims. After 
all, the results of past genetic engineering have left Gold-Red pairs 
incapable of reproducing “naturally,” as evidenced by the significant 
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efforts that Sevro’s parents took in order to conceive him. Moreover, these 
formidable physical barriers to reproduction are supplemented by 
additional social and environmental ones, not the least of which is their 
Society’s violent reactions to “hybrids” and their parents. These sorts of 
barriers preventing gene flow between Golds and Reds all have analogues 
in the natural world, where species are isolated from one another by 
geography and mating rituals, and not just by their reproductive 
physiology. 
For all its simplicity, however, the BSC has a number of drawbacks. First, 
as Sevro’s example makes apparent, the barriers preventing one group of 
organisms from interbreeding with another are often less than perfect. 
Because of this, we have to make decisions about just how much isolation 
is “good enough” to count as a new species. It seems likely that Darrow 
and Adrius may disagree on how this applies to the differences between 
the Colors. Second, this concept doesn’t apply at all to beings that don’t 
reproduce sexually. In our world, these organisms (which form the 
majority of all life) consist primarily of bacteria, but in the world of Red 
Rising, things are considerably different. It is suggested, for example, that 
Pinks may be permanently sterile. If this is the case, then they may well 
reproduce by asexual means (perhaps they are clones grown in vats, or 
implanted in surrogate mothers?). If this were the case, the BSC would 
hold that Pinks do not belong to any species, even if all of the other Colors 
do, as Adrius claims. This result is, to put it mildly, a bit disconcerting.  
ALTERNATIVES TO THE BSC 
The phylogenetic species concept (PSC) represents a prominent 
alternative to the BSC. According to this concept, biological taxa 
(including species, but also genus, family, and so on) should include all 
and only those organisms descending from a common ancestor. In the 
context of Red Rising, this concept might give a variety of answers to the 
species question, depending on which ancestor you start from. For 
example, Golds and Reds both descend from an ancient human common 
ancestor, and so we might plausibly count all three groups (Gold, Reds, 
“old” humans) as being members of the species homo sapiens. However, 
given his dedication to highlighting differences between the Colors, the 
Jackal might well choose to focus on more recent ancestors, who were 
themselves Golds and Reds. By this, definition, Golds and Reds would 
again be separate species. Unlike the BSC, the PSC can also account for 
asexual species, so Pinks (and bacteria) would no longer be a “problem” 
case for Adrius. 
Just as with the BSC, however, the PSC runs into problems. First, it has a 
problem in dealing with splinter groups that break off from a larger group, 
and form new species. For example, let’s suppose that the Jackal is right, 
and that Golds really are a different species than the other colors. 
However, let’s complicate things a bit, and pretend that Silvers, at some 
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point, broke off from the early Golds. So, perhaps the early Golds decided 
to design a new Color, and (as a starting point) used the DNA from one or 
more Golds. According to the PSC, this leaves us with a dilemma 
regarding the relation of the Golds living after the Gold-Silver split with 
those living before it. If Adrius wants to claim that he (and other current 
Golds) are the same species as the old, pre-split Golds, the PSC will force 
him to admit that the Silvers are NOT a different species, since both groups 
descend from the same common ancestor (a pre-split Gold).  By contrast, 
if Adrius wants to claim that the current Golds and current Silvers really 
are different species, then he also has to admit that the current Golds are a 
different species than the pre-split Gold. The one thing the PSC will 
absolutely not allow is for Adrius to claim that he is both (1) the same 
species as the old Golds and (2) a different species from modern Silvers. 
Confusing, right? 
This same problem appears in a different way when we consider the 
(presumably widespread) genetic engineering of the Red Rising Society, 
and the way this allows genetic information to flow back and forth 
between the Colors. Suppose, for instance, scientists discover that certain 
genes are linked to increased strength in a certain tribe of Obsidians. They 
might (reasonably) use this information to alter Golds to make them (and 
their offspring) stronger. As a consequence, the new, stronger generation 
of Golds can trace their genetic descent not just from their Gold parents, 
but also (indirectly) from the Obsidians and their ancestors. Now, we are 
left with a puzzle: “Does this prove that Obsidians and Golds the same 
species, after all?” We might be tempted to say “yes,” until we remember 
that this sort of horizontal gene transfer need not involve a closely related 
group, but could have come from a far different sort of organism, such an 
insect or a fish. So, it seems like the PSC cannot definitively answer our 
question after all. 
A third concept of species, the ecological species concept (ESC), identifies 
species with those lineages adapted to specific environmental niches. 
Reds, for instance, are adapted to working in cramped mines, while Blues 
are “made” to live in spaceships. Moreover, the differing demands of these 
environments play a key role in explaining why the groups stay separate. 
So, for example, it seems like the genetic makeup of each Color was 
originally designed for optimal performance in its respective niche, and 
that subsequent evolution has, if anything, pushed the Colors further and 
further apart, as subsequent generations of Blues have genomes rendering 
them ever more suitable for spaceflight, while Reds’ genomes makes them 
better and better miners. Unlike the BSC or PSC, this makes no 
assumptions about Reds’ and Blues’ capacities to interbreed with one 
another, nor about precise relationships among their ancestors. On this 
view, again, it seems as if the Jackal may have won the day.  
Just as was the case with the first two species concepts, however, there are 
reasons to be skeptical of the Jackals’ claim, as the ESC can quickly lead 
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to strange conclusions. Not all Reds, for instance, live on Mars: some 
might live on the Luna, or on the moons of Jupiter. Moreover, while their 
niche in these places may still involve mining, this may occur under far 
different conditions: the gravity may be weaker, the atmosphere different, 
and so on, all of which will plausibly lead to genetic differences in future 
generations (especially given the aggressive applications of genetic 
engineering techniques). However, it would be very strange to think of 
these Reds as different species from Mars Red, especially if they shared a 
common descent with other Reds, and are capable of interbreeding. A 
much more radical change in the Reds’ niche is suggested by Darrow’s 
and Mustang’s success, which will free future Reds to do much more than 
they ever have. When one takes account of all of this, one is again pushed 
toward the idea that “they are all just humans, after all.” Again, though, it 
seems that ESC is not capable of deciding one way or other. 
WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 
In the end, then, it seems as if our concepts of species aren’t really 
designed to answer the question “Are the various Colors really different 
species?,” or at least can’t do so without much more data. They neither 
provide definite support for the Jackal’s claims, nor provide an easy 
method for refuting him. Darwin himself argued that this sort of 
phenomena was much more widespread than people recognized. Among 
other things, he suggested that there was often no clear line between what 
counted as species and what counted as a variety within a species, and that 
nature simply didn’t match up with humanity’s demands that the living 
world be divided neatly into discrete species. This wasn’t merely a 
problem of our ignorance, but of the way the world is. If Darwin is right, 
it simply might be that the argument between Adrius and Darrow has no 
single, objectively correct answer, in part because our normal ways of 
thinking about what species are don’t work well when applied to scenarios 
described in Red Rising. 
So, what does this mean for the society of Red Rising, and for us? First, it 
is important to recognize the irrelevance of the biological distinctions 
being debated here to the sorts of moral and political questions that lie at 
the heart of the Jackal’s and Darrow’s disagreements. Even if the Golds 
were a different species, for example, this doesn’t mean that they have 
justification for treating the Colors in the way they do. This would be the 
case even if Adrius were correct in thinking that the Golds are (on average) 
stronger and smarter than the other Colors. The philosopher Peter Singer, 
among others, has forcefully argued that it is a mistake to think that the 
moral equality between individuals depends on their being equally 
intelligent or physically capable. Instead, moral equality derives from the 
fact that other people—regardless of their gender, race, disability status, 
cognitive ability, or anything else—have interests, just the same as we do. 
The reason it is wrong for the Golds to enslave the Reds is because Reds, 
just like Golds, want something better from their lives.   
7 
 
A second, related point concerns the importance of things besides biology 
in creating and maintaining distinctions between the Colors. Being born a 
Gold, for instance, provides one with much different (and much more 
advantageous) education and upbringing than being born a Red. Gold 
children are brought up learning they are “meant” to rule, while Red 
children are taught they are “meant” to be miners. These sorts of 
differences are present in almost every aspect of their lives—the jobs they 
work, the way they raise their children, the religions and stories they are 
exposed to, and so on. These non-biological differences are, without a 
doubt, at the heart of the reason that Adrius finds his proposed system of 
biological classification so attractive: he just knows that Golds are meant 
to rule, and he is determined to find biological differences that make the 
distinctions he is already committed to making. It should not be too 
surprising that, when he goes looking for some sort of biological 
differences between Colors, he can (sort of) find them. However, it’s 
crucially important to keep in mind that Adrius’s proposed classification 
wasn’t arrived at by a disinterested consideration of the biological 
evidence, and that it certainly doesn’t support his belief that Golds are 
superior to the other Colors. Again, this holds lessons for the real world: 
we ought to be especially skeptical when we “discover” that biology 
provides support for our preexisting biases. 
The final point to note is that, in the end, we should recognize that the 
“correct” way to make biological distinctions will frequently depend on 
what we are trying to do. Biologists, for example, often use the different 
concepts of species described here to measure the “biodiversity” of an 
environment, so that this research can guide efforts to maintain or protect 
this diversity. Given this sort of goal, the fact that there is “no single right 
answer” to the question “how many species are there?” need not pose any 
difficultly.  Each species concept provides us with valuable information 
about the diversity of life, all of which might be relevant to us.  In the case 
of Red Rising, the challenge facing Mustang and Darrow at the end of the 
books is a very different one: how can they can help create a society that 
treats all of its citizens (regardless of their Color) fairly and equitably? 
Biological research may well have a role to play in helping to bring this 
about; however, it can do so effectively only if accompanied by the 
wisdom to interpret its findings in ways that allow them to overcome the 
particular barriers they encounter.  
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